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VICHY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
 
It may seem risky for the non-jurist to delve into this type of subject. 
However, with the reader’s indulgence, I would like to present a 
historian’s perusal of a number of avenues of inquiry, in particular legal 
ones. These inquiries all relate to an issue that has taken on extreme 
importance over the course of the century – namely the limits of one 
individual's power over another individual. 
 
Introduction: Dean Bonnard speaks 
The scene takes place in Bordeaux, on October 4, 1940. In the 
ceremony inaugurating the academic year at the Law School, Roger 
Bonnard, one of the leading figures in public law discusses the 
institutions recently created by the authoritarian state in what one of 
his students would soon term “the Revolution of 1940”. I quote Dean 
Bonnard: 
The changes will be major ones. They will affect the basic 
principles which have guided our public law since the Revolution of 
1789, namely individual freedom, democracy and the separation of 
powers. […] These principles will be discarded not because they have 
outlived their purpose, having been useful at a given point in time, 
but because they are fundamentally bad in themselves as destroyers 
of the State, and conflict with the idea of the State itself. They are 
absolute errors, both in theory and in practice.1 
 
These comments were fairly well illustrated by the fact that a few 
days earlier, the Council of Ministers had adopted what was to become 
the law of October 3, 1940 dealing with the status of Jews. This law 
created a new category of citizen (or rather semi-citizen), the Jew, 
defined as “any individual with three grandparents of the Jewish race, 
                                            
1 Revue du Droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger 
XLVII année, 1940, p 149-150. Dean Bonnard (who should not be confused 
with the Education Minister from 1942-1944 Abel Bonnard) maintained this 
type of judgment, writing in the same journal one year later concerning a 
work on the Constitution: “It is inoperative to wish to rectify the 
deformations of democratic institutions because these institutions bear 
within them the seeds of their own destruction.” ibid, 1941, p.411. 
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or two grandparents of the same race, if the spouse is Jewish.” The law 
prohibited any Jew holding a whole series of positions in the press, the 
cinema and the civil service. According to the memoirs of Paul 
Baudouin, then Foreign Minister, Marshall Pétain was not among the 
most lenient in his criteria for this long and severe list, since Pétain 
would have preferred that “the legal and educational systems no longer 
contained a single Jew”. 
After such an introduction, it may seem somewhat paradoxical to 
inquire whether the Vichy regime did or not exemplify the rule of law. A 
little semantic clarification is needed here, since words and legal 
concepts also have a history. After Auschwitz, after the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, after the disappearance of the 
Soviet Union as well, “rule of law” became synonymous with “rule of 
human rights.” This was not the case in 1940 when the Vichy Regime 
was founded – if only because Human Rights and the beliefs it stood for 
were singularly out of favor. My question is whether the Republic of 
France viewed itself, and above all was viewed, as under the rule of law 
in the meaning ascribed to it at that time – a meaning arising from 75 
years of analysis of the theory of public law. However aside from a 
historical response, we also need to focus on the lessons to be drawn 
from the issue of rule of law in the Vichy regime, and French 
involvement in the Nazi extermination of the Jews of Europe. 
 
Historical Recapitulation of the concept of Rule of Law 
Before it became “an umbrella term […] serving as the guarantor and 
the cloak for the most contradictory proposals”2 the term “rule of law” 
had a highly specific history and meaning in French legal thought. 
Originating in the desire to strengthen the liberal concept of the State, 
it ended up by challenging the unbridled reign of law as defined by the 
French theory of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The concept of rule of law emerged in France at the turn of the century 
as a transposition or simple translation of the German doctrine of 
Rechtsstaat. The concept can be traced back to mid-nineteenth century 
liberal jurists whose goal was to “police” the police state, the 
authoritarian state, with its unlimited power to dominate. It would be 
too lengthy – and in any case beyond my abilities – to describe all the 
ramifications of this idea of the State, the wellspring of all law, 
imposing limitations on its own capacity to dominate. The leading 
figures of French public law in the period between the two World Wars 
attempted to do just this, fueling heated debates, such as those 
                                            
2 Jacques Chevallier, L'État de droit, Montchrestien, coll. “Clefs”, 2d 
Edition, 1994, p.151. 
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opposing the Bordeaux-based Duguit to Hauriou from Toulouse – on the 
basis of formulations by their German speaking counterparts. One of 
these was the Austrian Hans Kelsen who pushed the concept to its 
logical extreme by postulating an equation between the State and law, 
when the law took the form of a perfectly hierarchical and embedded 
order. 
Nevertheless, even this purely formal definition incorporated the broad 
principles of political liberalism. The Kelsian State, synonymous of law, 
like the State subjected to law in less radical thinkers, was a State 
that respected these “broad principles [of] our public law,” which Dean 
Bonnard was to denounce in 1940. The Vichy government supplanted 
this inheritance of the Revolution (individual freedom, democracy, 
separation of powers) by a political philosophy where the individual 
could not exist outside of society, the “tyranny of numbers” translated a 
false notion of equality, and the weakening of authority ruined the 
State. Very logically, the State proceeded to concentrate the executive, 
the legislative and some judicial powers in the hands of the aged Savior 
of the Country. Given this clear renunciation of republican principles, 
one would have expected an equally clear reaction from French public 
law specialists. This reaction did not occur because, in the troubled 
years of the thirties, the concept of rule of law in France conflicted less 
(as it did in 19th century Prussia where it was born), with the 
authoritarian state than with the absolute power of the law, incarnated 
by the paradoxical institution of a Parliament which was both all-
powerful and powerless. 
Further details can be found in Marie-Joelle Redor's Ph.D. in Law, in 
which she studies jurists' attempts to devise, between the beginning of 
the Third Republic and World War I, a transition from what she calls 
the “legal state” to the “rule of law.” A legal state was defined as a 
state where the law can do anything as the emanation of the general 
will expressed by the elected representatives of the sovereign people.3 
The rule of law opposes its liberal vision to this concept, arising directly 
from 1789. It is distrustful of the “excesses” of universal suffrage. The 
objective is nothing less than to “end the Revolution” – by stopping at 
the liberal and bourgeois Revolution of 1789, not at the Revolution of 
1793. In any case it must not degenerate – with the increment of the 
industrial revolution – into either “democratic despotism” or social 
revolution. 
                                            
3 Marie-Joëlle Redor, De l'État légal à l'État de droit. L'évolution des 
conceptions de la doctrine publiciste française, 1879-1914, Economica-Presses 
de l'Université d'Aix-Marseille, 1992. 
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It would doubtless be an overstatement to view the comments made 
by Joseph Barthélemy in 1908 as forerunners of the explanation the 
Justice Minister would use to justify the special sections in the Riom 
trial. Barthélemy quoted Guizot as a reminder that “the sovereignty of 
justice, reason and law is the principle that should be upheld against 
the sovereignty of the people.”4 Hadn't this young and brilliant 
professor, future moderate Deputy during the inter-war period, already 
internalized this rejection of divisive politics symbolized by 
parliamentarians who became the defenders of vested interests? In 
contrast he championed the glorification of abilities – in particular that 
of the judge –all of which are ideas that promoted– in the name of legal 
reason – the notion of rule of law.5 
The objective of this doctrine was ultimately to demonstrate that the 
law is not omnipotent. There is in fact a rightful norm – the norm of law 
controlled by the judge – that is stronger than the legal norm. Although 
the law was voted by a parliament that is formally sovereign, it was 
increasingly unable to comprehend the complex realities of economic and 
social life in a country that has fully entered the industrial age. The 
proof would be provided in particular in commentaries on important 
administrative legal decrees. The period corresponds very logically to 
the golden age of the Council of State whose at times daring legal 
rulings would fill in legislative gaps. On the ideological level, two 
theories destined to have a heady future were being crystallized at this 
same time at the turn of the century. The first was corporatism, whose 
main proponent was Charles Benoist, professor at the School of Political 
Science, and moderate representative from Paris. Disseminated widely 
by those who, during the thirties were looking for remedies to the crisis 
of the State created by weaknesses inherent to democracy, it was based 
on a second newly emerging theory, that of the glorification of “abilities.” 
This glorification resulted in the emergence of the technician, the 
antidote, point for point of the parliamentarian's defects and the 
caricatures of the time. In the conservative terminology of the Third 
Republic the politician had ceased to look like the lynx described by 
Balzac during the early 19th century. Rather he had taken on the weak 
silhouette of the small town bourgeois – often from the south – with his 
accompanying stereotypes: he is a braggart, a gossip and lazy. 
Combining incompetence, dishonesty and cowardliness, he is only 
moved by the small things: minute services to be rendered to his 
constituents, which prompts him to bombard the hall with petitions, 
but above all a disproportional ambition to earn a medal regardless of 
                                            
4 Ibid, p.315. 
5 Ibid, p. 325 
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type. Deputy from the Auvergne backwoods, he would not turn up his 
nose for the assistant secretariat of the merchant marine. If specialized 
in customs duties, he would develop a passion for physical education.6 
In contrast to this opportunism neglectful of the general interest, the 
technician is defined by his efficiency based on ability, the result of 
expert knowledge – with no need for justification to the mere mortal. 
The technical abilities of the engineer, the administrative abilities of 
the civil servant, or the legal abilities of the judge, all argue for a 
reinforcement of the executive and the development of regulatory power. 
Clearly when defined in this way, the concept of rule of law would not 
conflict with doctrinal endorsement of the radically new regime which 
was emerging in the early Summer of 1940. In particular because it did 
not dare take its considerations to its logical conclusion; namely, if rule 
of law is superior to the law, control over the constitutionality of laws is 
the outcome. Jurists would not venture so far, doubtless out of fear of a 
‘government of judges’ which is so contradictory to French national 
tradition, but also because they would have been hard put to give it a 
solid foundation. Neither the “social solidarity” championed by Duguit7 
or Hauriou’s “social constitution” formed a solid body of norms upon 
which control of this type could be based. This is, incidentally, the 
problem of all natural law. But exploring this feature could lead us far 
afield … Note for our purposes that the law remains the highest norm 
and is not subject to appeal. The Vichy government would take ample 
advantage of this. 
 
From Lack of Abilities to Abilities 
Although these characteristics demonstrate that the legal philosophy 
of the French state is not circumstantial, they should not prompt us to 
exaggerate continuities by assuming erroneous consequences. In order 
for France to change its political regime, the shock of defeat and the 
very specific event of the Occupation had to occur. The amassing of 
powers into the hands of Marshall Pétain, which was one of the key 
features of the new constitutional regime was not the mere amplified 
continuation of the decrees used frequently by the dying Third Republic 
to serve executive power. This enormous upheaval, defeat, exile, and 
                                            
6 Jean Estèbe, “Le parlementaire”, in Jean-François Sirinelli (ed), Histoire 
des droites en France, vol. 3, Sensibilités, Gallimard, 1992, pp. 321- 352. The 
present article is adapted from a paper presented at the Workshop in honor 
of Jean Estèbe, professor of history at the University of Toulouse (1932-
1997), whose last works deal with Toulouse 1940-1944 (Perrin, 1997) and Les 
Juifs à Toulouse et en midi toulousain au temps de Vichy (Presses 
Universitaires du Mirail, 1996). 
7 M-J. Redor, op. cit., p.174. 
 146 
fear were all necessary for the Republic to bequeath itself, personally in 
a way, to the aged Marshall. Once this change in constitutional regime 
had been enacted formally on July 10, 1940, things happened fast. The 
next day, July 11, three constitutional acts eliminated the Republic, 
concentrated all powers except the power to declare war in the hands of 
Marshall Pétain, and adjourned the two chambers. This was the end of 
the ‘principles destructive to the state’ which Dean Bonnard would 
mention a few months later. 
Among the edifices which Vichy would begin to construct – similar to 
the builders which Maurice Chevalier would exalt in his “mason’s song” 
so metaphoric of the new regime – exclusion ranked highly. Note that 
the first law dealing with matters concerning the Vichy government 
(after the law appointing the members of the government) was a 
xenophobic text forbidding individuals born to a foreign father to belong 
to a ministerial cabinet. This was only the first of the “lack of 
qualifications” laws which legal experts would produce, civil servants 
would apply and the judges would validate – the most emblematic 
being the law of October 3, 1940 dealing with the status of Jews. 
This particular law has prompted the most discussion in recent 
controversies on the issue of the attitude of a judge towards a 
malevolent law. It has been analyzed in two major symposia (“Judging 
under Vichy” and “Antisemitic law of Vichy”) organized respectively by 
the Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature in 1993 and by the University of 
Dijon the year after, symposia whose important proceedings were both 
published by the review “Le Genre Humain.”8 These proceedings 
confirm that the extremism of the law frightened legal experts in the 
Republic, but no longer bothered them under Vichy. I have only found 
one jurist, Julien Laferriere, who argued that nothing could prevent the 
Council of State from drawing the conclusion that since Vichy laws were 
decrees issued by the Chief of State and debated in the Council of 
Ministers, they were no longer the expression of the general will, and 
could be appealed.9 This would have made it possible – to slip 
momentarily into historical fiction – for the Conseil d'État to censure the 
emergency decrees as contrary to equality in the civil service. 
                                            
8 Juger sous Vichy, proceedings of the November 29, 1993 workshop, Le 
Genre Humain, n.28, and Le Droit Anti-Sémite de Vichy, proceedings of the 
symposium held in Dijon on December 19 and 20, 1994, Le Genre Humain, 
n.30-31. 
9 Le Nouveau Droit public de la France, Sirey, 1941 p. 9. Among others, 
Bonnard defended exactly the reverse in his Precis de droit administratif, 
4th edition (“revised and updated to include administrative reforms”) LGDJ, 
1943, p.303. 
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These new “ lacks of ability” – which here again the doctrine would 
help legitimate – affected both Jews and children of foreigners. Free 
Masons were also to be expelled from the State, and more generally all 
opponents to the regime, starting with the civil servant union leaders 
who were the “pet hates”. Once its ranks cleared of ‘the morally inept 
individuals it was infested with – the terms are those of the period – 
the new state could allow ability to triumph. This was the era when 
greatest ability, the logic of skills championed. The finance minister 
was an inspector of finance, the communications portfolio was held by a 
graduate of the famous École polytechnique, and public education was 
in the hands of a university professor. The Council of State was granted 
a major role in this arrangement: a symbolic role, since it had the honor 
in August 1941 of receiving Marshall Pétain – the first chief of state to 
attend the Council since Napoleon – but a real role as well, since as the 
highest administrative body, as stipulated by a law of December, 1940 
it was supposed to help formulate laws10. However its hopes were 
dashed. The Council of State was not systematically associated – far 
from that – with lawmaking of the French State (hence it did not write, 
as a body, the statute on Jews). Once again, however the Council was 
forced to admit that the new legislative body – i.e. the government and 
its administration – were doubtless more efficient that the defunct 
Parliament, but also infinitely more muddled. Its Vice-President 
complained to the successive justice ministers, and anyone who reads 
the abundant output of the normative texts of the time can only be 
struck by its bureaucratic, hesitant and uncertain tone. 
Even the most loyal supporters of the regime were chagrined by the 
downward slide of authoritarian state into bureaucratic state. Any 
number of the long-time defenders of Pétainism saw in it a sign of the 
demise of the regime. Dean Bonnard, once again, drew this conclusion 
in a theoretical book he wrote in 1942 on Constitutional Theory and 
Practice of the regime. Compare this to the introduction to the book: 
Some people believe or pretend to believe that the current 
authoritarian regime is only an accident due to circumstances that 
will disappear with these circumstances and will, with normalcy, 
return parliamentary democracy. This is merely fooling oneself and 
taking one’s dreams for reality. 
First of all the political regime of 1875 cannot come back to life. 
When a political regime falls, weighted down by so many 
unforgivable faults and bearing the responsibility of an 
unspeakable disaster, as was the case for our parliamentary 
                                            
10 Without even mentioning the flight of members of the Council of State 
to active administration, which refers to another analysis. 
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democracy, it cannot recover from its collapse since it would then 
appear to be riddled with irreparable vices. Not only were men 
shunted aside, institutions were permanently condemned and 
abolished.11 
 
Here is his conclusion: 
Although I believe in the superiority of the authoritarian regime 
over the democratic regime, I also believe that the authoritarian 
regime can be worse than the democratic regime, if it does not 
contain certain stipulations in particular to avoid it degenerating 
into bureaucracy. However I fear that the fatal error in which the 
authoritarian regime of 1940 is sinking a little more every day is 
indeed the domination of bureaucracy.12 
 
The “great legal expert” states that what constituted this “fatal error” 
was the dogmatism with which the new state had dissolved all 
associations, groups or councils likely to suggest that the authority of 
the chief of state was not indivisible. I am not referring here to civil 
servant unions, the pet hate of both the government and many jurists . 
Nor am I referring to such scarcely subversive associations as the 
“Société des agrégés” or the “Association du corps préfectoral” – both of 
which were dissolved upon orders from the government. However as 
regards the many councils holding seats in all the ministries, the Dean 
of Bordeaux argued that they were “made up for the most part by 
people active in the departments, [they] could provide useful 
information to […] the central authorities.”13 By depriving itself of the 
advantages of this ‘consultative administration’ which Pierre 
Rosanvallon14 has shown to be important to the running of the state 
under the Third Republic, (in particular in social matters), Bonnard 
predicted that the government risked paralysis and the decomposition 
of the regime by suffocation of the general interest under bureaucratic 
weight. The prediction was not wrong. 
What weight could the Council of State's scope of independence wield 
in these circumstances, given this new type of State which was formally 
under rule of law but in practice mostly subjected to the goodwill of the 
                                            
11 Les Actes Constitutionnels de 1940, LGDJ, 1942, p.2. 
12 Ibid, p. 177. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Le peuple introuvable. Histoire de la représentation démocratique en 
France, Gallimard, 1998, pp. 257-265. This book contains three consecutive 
chapters on the “democracy in the parties” and to democracy in the unions 
and the consultative administration under the generic title of “democracy 
and equilibrium”. See also M.-J. Redor, op. cit., p.91. 
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administrations? Doubtless, as supreme administrative arbitrator, the 
Council of State was prevented from fulfilling its mission. It did its duty 
without servility, since not all the decrees it handed down were to the 
government’s liking. In a situation of an authoritarian state, the judge 
could annul ministerial decisions, even those dealing with expulsion. 
The jurisprudence concerning the application of the Jewish laws was 
obviously rejected15 but through a process of neutralization examined by 
Daniele Lochak in a pioneering article.16. In addition most of these 
rulings were handed down after the Council of State had returned to its 
Parisian headquarters in the Palais Royal. In the slightly less than two 
year period that separated this return at the end of June 1942 from the 
instigation of the Vichy Regime, its activity was, because of 
circumstances, above all administrative. The rulings that I have read 
concerning the expulsion laws, testify to an adherence by the High Court 
to the principles of the National Revolution. Does this type of behavior 
correspond in these conditions to the canonical definition of rule of law, 
which posits a genuine “control of administrative activity by an 
independent judge”? “Independent” could easily be the topic of lengthy 
debate, given that the degree of independence was to increase with 
time17. As was the case for almost all the administration, the Council of 
State of January 1944 – the date of a ruling which overturned the 
removal from his post by the minister of education of a school 
headmaster presented as ‘Gaullist’ – laid the groundwork for this type 
of transition. Through the gradual build up by the Free French forces in 
London and more clearly in Algiers, of a new legal order which gained in 
strength as the Vichy regime declined, this transition hardly posed any 
problems for the administration. As a prefect of the time wrote 
candidly, civil servants had to serve the future government, headed by 
General de Gaulle, as loyally as they had served the previous 
government, that of Marshall Pétain. 
 
                                            
15 An analysis of the Council of State's attitude can be found in an article 
by Jean Massot, himself a high-ranking member of the Council of State, “le 
Conseil d'État et le regime de Vichy”, Vingtième siècle, n.58, April-June 
1998, pp.83-99. 
16 “Les mésaventures du positivisme ou la doctrine sous Vichy,” in Les 
Usages sociaux du droit, CURAPP - Presses Universitaires de France, 1989, 
pp. 252-285. 
17 The particularly indulgent article by the State councilor Tony 
Bouffandeau published in the first collection of Etudes et documents du 
Conseil d'État, 1947 should be contrasted with the severe article by 
Professor Olivier Dupeyroux, “L'independence du Conseil d'État judeant au 
contentieux”, Revue du Droit Public, 1983, n.3, pp. 565-629. 
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A Return to Natural Law ? 
Despite the fact that this substitute legal order had proclaimed itself 
legitimate since June 16, 1940, there was a need for the Gaullist 
political fiction that Vichy was never a State. The war had to be won on 
the legitimacy front, one where we find the handful of jurists who rallied 
to La France Libre, the first and foremost of whom was René Cassin. 
Today's ‘historical Gaullists’ – such as the ones who came to testify in 
favour of Maurice Papon during his trial which began in the fall of 1997 
– should have understood that supporting this position more than a 
half a century after the facts, hence confusing the symbolic and the real, 
is meaningless, in particular in the eyes of the new generations.18 The 
Vichy regime obviously existed, and existed as a State. One could 
inquire, as did a number of conservative theoreticians, whether the 
regime remained a state until the end. According to Michel Troper, a 
law professor highly critical of the concept itself of rule of law19, what 
could be questioned is calling the mode of power in Nazi Germany a 
state, because of its lack of a stable hierarchical legal system. However, 
Troper argues, what do we gain by refusing to use the word “state” to 
describe this polycracy in which factions – in the party or the 
administration or the army – engaged in ferocious battles? He answers 
in the following way: 
 [We gain] a great deal on the theoretical level, if we draw all the 
conclusions from identification of State and Law. This implies first 
of all that the State is nothing other than the name given to a 
political power when it is exercised in a certain form, the legal form; 
secondly that there is a relationship between the form of power and 
the content of the decisions that are made.20 
 
What is needed – and would at the same time be highly complex – is 
to transpose this concept to the French state. Vichy France was clearly 
not national-socialist Germany and it has become commonplace to point 
out the reasons why Vichy was not a fascism, or at least only partially 
in its final days. When the Milice state was set up in the propaganda 
and public security sectors at the start of 1944, Vichy indeed began to 
engage in a Fascist process, which would go as far as the partial 
                                            
18 And is even counter-productive in terms of what we can imagine was the 
objective of these men and women – all indisputably Resistants and often 
associated from the start with the Gaullist movement – i.e. explaining and 
defending the actions of General de Gaulle at that time. 
19 Which is for him “either a contradiction in terms or a tautology”, “Le 
concept d'État de droit”, Droits, n.15, 1992, p. 51-63 (loc. cit. p.55). 
20 “Y a-t-il eu un État Nazi?” in Pour une théorie juridique de l'État, PUF, 
1994, p. 177-182. 
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disbanding of state administrations under the authority of Joseph 
Darnand. This was the era of brutal violence, the era of court martial, 
the cruel battle against the Resistants. It was the time of the murder of 
Jean Zay, Hélène and Victor Basch, and Georges Mandel which would 
lead to the final moments of the regime. The frightened Pétain did not 
disavow Darnand earlier than August 6, 1944 when he criticized the 
Milice for making an indelible stain on French history. Darnand replied, 
rightly enough, that it would have been better to come to this 
realization earlier. 
Realization could have come earlier – even before the Milice was 
created. The events of the summer of 1942 – the first round-ups carried 
out by the French police changed things a great deal. Although the fate 
of the Jews was an important issue for the regime, it was not crucial to 
its options. In the autumn of 1940 and later in June 1941, the status 
of Jews was only one form of exclusion among others (the period was 
not lacking in them since the regime had its share of enemies). We 
know from Serge Klarsfeld's work that the roundups of 1942, however 
carefully they were prepared and implemented, were designed above all 
to be a sign of collaborationist goodwill on the part of the French 
government.  
These events were discussed a great deal at the time, as were many 
other things, and much less was said afterwards, until recently, when a 
definition of the rule of law was made the key to an analysis of ethical 
principles as regards crimes against humanity. The outcome of this 
debate was that natural law, after having been rejected, had to be 
included once again the argument. Reference to natural law is the only 
way to cease qualifying the Vichy regime as an example of rule of law; 
namely at the point in time when Vichy agreed to put government in the 
service of organized murder.  
This particular area has been dealt with extensively in numerous and 
seminal legal works. The non-jurist cannot go very far except to point to 
the fact that the controversy, which began at the turn of the century on 
the basis of Kelsen’s works, continues between those for whom “it is by 
no means necessarily true that the rules of law reflect or should reflect 
certain moral obligations,” and those who wish to believe in contrast 
that “[there are] certain principles of human behavior which are waiting 
to be discovered by human reason and which laws made by man should 
adhere to in order to be valid.”.21 The latter go back to Antiquity.” For 
                                            
21 Herbert L.A. Hart, Le concept de Droit, Bruxelles, publications de 
l'Université Saint-Louis, 1976, p. 224, quoted by Pierre Bouretz, “Le droit 
et la règle: Herbert L.A. Hart” in Pierre Bourretz (ed) La force du droit. 
Panorama des débats contemporains, éditions Esprit, 1991, p.42. 
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there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice 
and injustice that is binding on all men”, wrote Aristotle,22 after 
Socrates. 
Nor deemed I that thy decrees were of such force,  
that a mortal could override the unwritten and unfailing statutes of 
heaven. 
For their life is not of to-day or yesterday, but from all time,  
and no man knows when they were first put forth.  
Not through dread of any human pride  
could I answer to the gods for breaking these. (Antigone)23 
 
However, although the widespread use today of the concept of rule of 
law implicitly postulates natural law to be self evident, it is 
anachronistic to transpose these conclusions to this period. 
Furthermore, as Michael Troper has pointed out,24 by interpreting and 
explaining the exclusion laws, and hence contributing to the process of 
euphemism concerning them, the jurists of the time were in no way 
positivists. For genuine positivists who confer upon the science of law 
the role of describing existing law in a neutral and objective fashion, 
axiological neutrality is in no way an ethical attitude.25 The ratio legis – 
what is termed the lawmaker's intention – is not within law but rather 
outside of law, and any attempt to define it “can hold some interest for 
the psychology of the lawmaker, for the sociology of law, for history, for 
meta-ethics [ …but] is entirely useless as regards the knowledge of law 
itself.”26 
We must thus return to history, or more precisely the history of the 
relationship between Vichy power and the spiritual authorities who 
initially supported it. Towards the end of August 1942 – when, as 
prefects' reports show, the French were shocked by the brutality with 
which the round ups were conducted in both zones – resounded the 
voice of Mgr. Saliège, archbishop of Toulouse, heard by all the faithful of 
his diocese on August 23, 1942: 
There is a Christian morality, there is a human morality which 
imposes duties and recognizes obligations. These duties and obligations 
are part of man’s nature; they come from God. They can be violated. It 
is not in the hands of any mortal to eliminate them. […] In our diocèse, 
                                            
22 Rhetoric I, 13. 
23 Sophocles, Antigone. 
24 In an article discussing this, quoted above, by Danièle Lochak: “La 
doctrine et le positivisme (à propos d'un article de Danièle Lochak)”, 
CURAPP, Les usages sociaux du droit, PUF, 1989, p.286-292. 
25 Ibid., p.288. 
26 Ibid., p.291. 
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terrible scenes have taken place in the camps of Noe and Recebedou. 
Jews are human beings. Foreigners are human beings. All things 
cannot be done against them, against these men, against these women, 
against these fathers and these mothers. They are part of the human 
race. They are our brothers as so many others are. A Christian cannot 
forget this. 
Superb words, quoted frequently since comparable examples were 
rare. Few in number were the prelates who followed the noble example 
of the archbishop of Toulouse: above all Mgr. Theas in Montauban and, 
in a somewhat lesser fashion Mgr. Moussaron of Albi, Mgr. Delay of 
Marseille and Cardinal Gerlier of Lyon. The Church of France did not 
react vigorously to the deportations. Nevertheless, I would go further 
than Jean Estèbe who viewed Mgr Saliège as “militant of the resistance 
to Nazi immorality, not resistance to the Vichy regime.”27 Although the 
archbishop never ceased respecting Marshall Pétain as a figure, and 
never encouraged subversion, his strident appeal to evangelical order 
and to morality contributed to weakening the foundations of the regime. 
In the archives of the secret services of the police one can find a report 
dated September 1942 stressing its impact on the Christian sectors of 
Paris which regretted the fact that more prelates – starting with Paris’ 
Cardinal Suhard – had not been moved to follow this example. Pierre 
Laval was right when he let it be known to the Vatican that the French 
government would greatly appreciate the removal of this “rebellious 
archbishop”28. 
When the National Council of Reform Churches mentioned 
“transgression of respect for the human individual” several days later, it 
was taking a stance in what Michel Foucault would much later term 
“bio-politics”, in other words “integration of individual's physical lives in 
the mechanisms and calculations of state power.” 29The Italian 
philosopher Giogio Agamben returned to this issue in a book published 
in Italy in 1995, and in France two years later entitled Homo Sacer: Le 
pouvoir souverain et la vie nue. The twentieth century has, in his 
opinion, given new life to homo sacer of ancient Roman law, defined as 
‘the man who can be killed without committing murder, but the one 
who cannot put to death in the ritual manner,30” since he is excluded 
from society. Agamben uses this metaphor to interpret Fascism and 
                                            
27 Toulouse…, op.cit., p.255. 
28 Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz, vol 1., Fayard, 1983, p.370. 
29 Nicolas Tenzer, comments on the book by Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. 
Le Pouvoir souverain et la vie nue (Seuil, 1997), in Le Banquet, 1st Semester 
1995, n.10, p. 310. 
30 Op. cit., back cover. 
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Nazism as having forced the relationship between sovereign power and 
“bare life” (the zoe of the Greeks, the opposite of organized life, bios) to 
its extreme. Observing that “human life is only politicized when 
abandoned to an unconditional power of death”31, he claims that the 
concentration camp, not the city, is the emblematic locus of the political 
society of our century, a place where violence and law have merged. 
This search for the hidden link between the legal-institutional model 
and the biopolitical model of power makes “bare life” a decisive political 
feature. It can also help show how democracies, without becoming 
examples of totalitarianism have implemented this adulteration of 
power into the politics of bare life, subjected to the sovereign's every 
whim. How does Vichy fit this perspective? Raymond Aron saw it as a 
perversion of the relationship of protection that was thought to exist 
between a state and its people who believe they are under its 
protection. Article 19 of the armistice agreement made it obligatory for 
the French government to return German refugees when requested to by 
Hitler's Reich. There is not only a difference in magnitude but in type 
between this first step and the acceptance by the French 
administration to take part in the mass murder of Jews. 
“France, take care not to lose your soul!” warned the Jesuit Gaston 
Fessard in the first issue of Temoignage Chretien as early as the fall of 
194132. The same tone can be found in a leaflet written by the Catholic 
Resistance in the spring of 1941, entitled “Opinion by a group of jurists 
and theologians.” The latter stated they were “struck by the difficulties 
encountered by a large number of their fellow citizens to understand the 
traditional doctrine of the Church regarding respect to the government,” 
and proposed defining the upper limits of obedience to the regime 
required by its representatives. Defining a legitimate government as 
“one whose authority, accepted by the people it governs, provides for the 
basic requirements of the public welfare” it concludes after a lengthy 
proof “[that] a government is not created to hand over its people but to 
defend them. It should act for its people and not against them. A 
government which has become powerless [..] is unable to guarantee 
basic rights. It can only render service to the enemy.”33 By defining the 
boundaries of obedience in this way, it helped provide answers to the 
questions raised by those “civil servants who are examining their 
                                            
31 Op. cit. p.100 
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consciences” so ironically depicted by Laval in June 194334. An attempt 
was made to ground these answers in the legal system, given that the 
civil service remained devoted to legality, both because of its 
background and its activities, in the face of a regime which continued to 
appear legal and even partially legitimate. The crux of the issue is less 
to determine whether it is appropriate to consider the Vichy Regime as 
dependent on the rule of law than to acknowledge the terrible 
consequences of this conjunction of the formal absolute of the law, 
inherited from the French Revolution, and an authoritarian and 
counter-revolutionary ideology. 
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